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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Michael Comstock 
 
Putin's war on crime & Ustinov's increasing power 
Perhaps borrowing a page from America's wars on drugs and now terrorism, 
President Vladimir Putin recently declared a war against crime in Russia, with the 
intent of bringing the nation's nearly unbelievable crime rate under control. 
(Russia has the second highest murder rate in the world.) Putin did not 
distinguish between traditional criminals and corrupt officials, stating that victims 
often face a disturbing choice: "On one side there is crime, on the other -- sadly 
very often -- they face unlawful actions by state representatives, including law 
enforcement agencies." (THE MOSCOW TIMES, 12 Feb 02; via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) With this declaration it becomes clear that "[the] prosecutors 
are effectively against the oligarchs." (VREMYA MN, 12 Feb 02; via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) Domestic opinion in Russia elevates lowering the crime rate 
to a political imperative for President Putin. In a recent meeting at the prosecutor 
general's office at which the role the agency and its head, Vladimir Ustinov, 
would play was outlined, a nearly complete list of who's who in Russian politics 
was in attendance. "The presidium of the meeting included: Security Council 
Secretary Vladimir Rushailo, FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev, Interior Minister 
Boris Gryzlov, Federal Tax Police Service chief Mikhail Fradkov, Justice Minister 
Yuri Chaika and Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov. The meeting also was attended 
by Constitutional Court Chairman Marat Baglai, Supreme Arbitration Court 
Chairman Veniamin Yakovlev, Auditing Commission Chairman Sergei Stepashin, 
Duma Speaker Gennadi Seleznev, presidential envoy Georgy Poltavchenko, the 
deputy chairman of the Supreme Court and the deputy minister for taxes and 
duties. Mikhail Vanin of the State Customs Committee was also present." 
(NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 12 Feb 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
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Some analysts believe that President Putin himself may have been in 
attendance, in contrast with recent practice. (VEK, 15 Feb 02; via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) It has been noted that the prosecutor general's office has 
become a political weapon to be used as a means of silencing opposition, such 
as Nikolai Aksenenko and Boris Berezovsky. The recent declaration of a war on 
crime and the fact that "the Prosecutor General's Office [has been] ordered to 
monitor the Interior Ministry and Federal Tax Police Service" as well as 
"coordination of interaction between prosecutor's office in federal districts with 
presidential envoys" indicate that Ustinov's position within the Russian 
government has expanded greatly; as one paper put it, "he is almost a deputy 
prime minister in charge of law enforcement agencies -- in all but the official title." 
(NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 12 Feb 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
If there is to be true war on crime, with Ustinov serving as the prosecutor-in-chief, 
then this can only mean the enhancement of his powers. Now that Putin has 
declared such a war publicly, he can hardly go back on his word; to do so would 
mean an inestimable loss of prestige. Putin now has to follow through with his 
war on crime and Vladimir Ustinov is his point man in the struggle. 
 
Notably absent from the mid-February meeting were the chairman of the 
government, Mikhail Kasyanov, and the head of the Kremlin Administration, 
Aleksandr Voloshin -- two individuals who are listed as being potential targets for 
the general prosecutor's office. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
'Furniture scandal' masks a deeper reality: power struggle 
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During the Soviet era, the KGB and other security services succeeded in 
maintaining some level of restraint over organized crime. Allowing small groups 
of criminals to flourish under its control, the KGB was able to limit and control 
crime outbreaks, and prevent the growth or creation of new crime groups. 
(EURASIA INSIGHT, 21 Jan 02; via Eurasianet) 
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union marked the beginning of a new era in Russian 
organized crime. Spurred on by the new economic openness, the Russian mafia 
spread its influence and money into almost every facet of Russian society. 
Organized crime has been a troubling reality in Russia for the last 10 years. What 
is relatively new and disturbing is the entry of the security services, led by the 
FSB, directly into this underground world. 
 
In the fall of 2001, the customs office initiated an investigation into two furniture 
companies, Grand and Tri Kata, jointly owned by Sergei Zuev and Yevgeni 
Zaostorvtsev. The investigation, led by Mikhail Vanin, resulted in charges that the 
business, using shell companies and intermediaries, had been able to evade 
some $8 million in customs and duties payments in 2000 alone. 
 
When these charges came to light, Zuev contacted the prosecutor general's 
office, complaining that the investigations had been improperly conducted and 
concluded. (RUSSIAN POLITICAL MONITOR, 23 Feb 02; via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) 
 
As a direct result of those complaints, the prosecutor general's office announced 
in December that it was launching its own investigation into the customs service, 
and that the officials being investigated were to be charged with "abuse of office." 
(RUSSIAN POLITICAL MONITOR, 3 Dec 01; via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database)  
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The FSB's involvement in this scandal is both simple and obvious. Yevgeni 
Zaostorvtsev's son, Yuri, is one of FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev's deputies. He 
is in charge of economic counterintelligence for the agency, and presumably 
acted as an intermediary for Grand and Tri Kata. This case is not the first 
occasion on which Zaostorvtsev's name has arisen in the national press. 
Nezavisimaya gazeta has asserted repeatedly that he receives regular payments 
from Solntsevo, one of Moscow's largest criminal groups. 
 
It is obvious that, at the very least, the FSB is corrupt at the second-highest level. 
But does the corruption involve Director Patrushev as well? While no allegations 
have been made directly by the press, Vanin, the investigating (and investigated) 
customs official, publicly alleged that Patrushev may be involved personally in 
the scandal. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 24 Jan 02) 
 
This scandal is undoubtedly poor publicity for an organization that already is 
facing serious public scrutiny over a multitude of questionable spy cases, 
including that of Grigory Pasko. With the unresolved issue of Patrushev's 
involvement or at least cognizance in the affair, the FSB is in a no-win situation, 
unless of course it can squash the investigation. An article by Novaya gazeta 
deputy editor and Duma Deputy Yuri Schekochikhin alleges the FSB paid to have 
the case dropped. After that article's publication, Schekochikhin had to hire 
guards to protect himself due to threats of reprisal from the FSB. (NOVAYA 
GAZETA, 18 Feb 02) 
 
If Patrushev -- a close friend and associate of President Vladimir Putin -- had no 
knowledge of the furniture affair, then his control over the FSB must be called 
into question. On the other hand, if Patrushev was involved in the scandal, then 
the corruption must be assumed to reach the very highest levels -- probably 
including Putin himself.  
 
 5 
At the moment, the latter is more likely. Still, if handled adroitly, the scandal could 
benefit those highest levels. The prosecutor's investigation has been expanded 
to include General Vladimir Orlov, who was first deputy minister of the interior 
under Vladimir Rushailo, as well as Vanin. Since Vanin is a "remnant" of the 
Yel'tsin years, it is likely that the furniture scandal is being used by Putin and the 
FSB to oust those officials who remain from Yel'tsin's presidency. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Luba Schwartzman 
 
MEDIA 
In his latest statement regarding the upcoming tender for the broadcasting 
license for the Channel 6 frequency, Russian Press Minister Mikhail Lesin 
reported that none of the entities that expressed a willingness to participate in the 
contest has submitted official bids. (NTVRU, 21 Feb 01; via www.ntvru.com) Of 
course there is still a week before the 6 March deadline, and it makes sense for 
the applicants to wait and see what the competitors are doing, or to gather the 
most financial and political support for their ventures. Yet there may be another 
factor behind hesitation expressed by all of the companies, organizations and 
individuals that had been so eager to have their very own TV channel: Some 
signs suggest that the authorities are maintaining a level of uncertainty 
purposefully and methodically, either to intimidate or to improve their bargaining 
position. 
 
One sign is the withdrawal of the weak and the cautious: Alfa Bank backed out of 
a consortium of companies supporting Yevgeny Kiselev's new OOO (Limited 
Liability Company) TV-6. Alfa Bank President Petr Aven told reporters that "the 
main reason for [the bank's] non-participation is that we engage in business, not 
 6 
politics. Alfa Bank is not a political organization, nor a party or movement, and 
therefore we do not want to join any unions or coalitions that will knowingly 
participate in political life." (INTERFAX, 0904 GMT, 19 Feb 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-
0219, via World News Connection) Oleg Kiselev, chairman of the board of 
directors of Metalloinvest, another prospective OOO TV-6 investor, resigned the 
day after pledging support for Kiselev's venture on behalf of his company. 
(NTVRU, 20 Feb 01; via www.ntvru.com) Mikhail Fridman of the Alfa Group, 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky of Yukos and Vladimir Potanin of Interros also have 
reneged on their original decision to join. (GAZETA.RU, 20 Feb 02; via Johnson's 
Russia List) 
 
Another indication is the State Duma's inability to gather enough votes for an 
official request that Putin leave TV-6 as a sports channel. It doesn't hurt to ask, 
and, unless they have heard otherwise, the deputies should be convinced that 
their fitness-loving president, who seeks greater sports spirit in Russia, would be 
very happy to have an all-sports-all-the-time channel. The original submission 
was supported by "a coalition of four," a coordinated council of the State Duma's 
centrist parties -- Unity, Fatherland-All Russia, People's Deputy and Regions of 
Russia. (NTVRU, 12 Feb 02; via www.ntvru.com) It is hard to believe that the 
core of the Duma would be unable to gather enough support on such a relatively 
harmless question. 
 
Then, of course, there are the 15 daily harassing and threatening calls received 
by Viktor Merezhko, a popular journalist, one of the original founders of TV-6, the 
general director of Channel and one of the founders of a prospective bidder, ZAO 
(Closed Company) TV-VI. (NTVRU, 18 Feb 02; via www.ntvru.com) 
 
The authorities are exerting pressure and the investors rightly feel forewarned. 
Yevgeny Kiselev has become more careful about disclosing information on 
potential investors and back-up plans (such as major shareholder Boris 
Berezovsky's idea of setting up an operation in the West) and Union of Right 
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Forces Chairman Boris Nemtsov has been dis-invited from negotiating with 
potential sponsors because of his tendency to blab when faced with cameras and 
microphones. (NTVRU, 12 & 14 Feb 02; via www.ntvru.com) 
 
With the right balance of pressure and promise, the Kremlin can make sure that 
even factors seemingly outside of its control influence the outcome of the tender. 
Thus, it will be in a position to bargain with the new owners of the Channel 6 
frequency. 
 
La censure est morte! 
Press Minister Lesin declared that opposition mass media is important and will 
continue to exist, but he rued "neo-Nazi and chauvinistic publications, mass 
media engaged in journalistic prostitution, gross defamation and dirty PR 
campaigns." He explained that the media ministry is trying to "crack down on 
such things in line with the law, which justifies the pressure being put by the 
authorities." (INTERFAX, 1332 GMT, 8 Feb 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0208, via World 
News Connection) At the same time, he stated that it should be the media's job 
to regulate the media market and that "there are no longer any resources either 
to introduce censorship or take control of any mass media." He suggested that a 
major problem of the mass media "is the failure of the media and journalists to 
understand the role of the media." (INTERFAX, 1816 GMT, 9 Feb 02; FBIS-SOV-
2002-0209, via World News Connection) 
 
Vive la censure! 
One could interject, however, that the government does have a few tricks up its 
sleeve when dealing with reporters. Journalist Grigory Pasko's sentence still 
stands despite the fact that the laws under which he was convicted were 
repealed by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court, while Novaya gazeta 
correspondent Anna Politkovskaya receives frequent threats and may lose her 
accreditation because of her independent reporting. She was accused of 
breaking regulations and misusing grant money from the Soros Foundation 
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during her latest trip to Chechnya, when she was attempting to investigate the 
murder of six civilians in the Shatoi region. Politkovskaya managed to escape 
from the FSB, who had detained her "for her own good." (NTVRU, 15 Feb 01; via 
www.ntvru.com) 
 
REGIONS 
April showers? We hope not 
Springtime is a time for love, flowers, and... discussions of nuclear waste. A little 
less than a year ago (See THE NIS OBSERVED 18 Apr 01), State Duma 
deputies were heatedly discussing a bill that would allow Russia to receive 
money from the West for storing nuclear waste. Little had been said about it in 
recent times, but as the end of worries about providing energy for the winter 
comes into sight, the aftereffects of acquiring energy enters the agenda. State 
Duma Deputy Sergei Mitrokhin (YABLOKO faction) and representatives of 
Greenpeace decided to investigate for themselves the security of Russia's 
nuclear sites. They managed to reach the territory of a storage facility in the 
Krasnoyarsk region and get right next to a barbed-wire fence that was so riddled 
with holes that they could have continued easily to go inside. Mitrokhin reiterated 
that "several dozen kilos of explosives" were enough to destroy the facility, 
already estimated to hold about 3 billion curie units of radioactivity. The group 
videotaped its venture and sent copies to the Russian president and to the FSB. 
(INTERFAX, 1814 GMT, 15 Feb 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0215, via World News 
Connection) 
 
Greenpeace also supported an action by 500 residents of another Krasnoyarsk 
town, Sosnovoborsk, blocking the railroad along which nuclear waste is brought 
in from abroad. Last year 41 tonnes arrived from Bulgaria; Greenpeace, together 
with the Krasnoyarsk Social and Ecological Union, has filed a suit demanding 
that the deal be rescinded, the waste returned and the perpetrators punished. 
(INTERFAX, 1648 GMT, 9 Feb 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0209, via World News 
Connection) 
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FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
The Colder War 
Lately, however, the State Duma -- and much of the nation -- has been 
concerned with a more pressing matter: Russia's athletic prestige. By a vote of 
421 to 0, with 1 abstention, the Duma approved an appeal to Chairman of the 
State Sport Committee Pavel Rozhkov and to President of the Russian Olympic 
Committee Leonid Tyagachev to leave the Olympics early and demonstratively 
skip the closing ceremony of the Salt Lake City Winter Games. President Putin, 
the Federation Council, the Russian Cabinet and the presidential administrators 
expressed their support for the action; President Putin declared that the Olympic 
judges are biased against Russia and other nations, such as South Korea; and 
protesters gathered outside the American and Canadian embassies in Moscow 
and Yekaterinburg carrying signs that read "Yankees, Give Us Back Our 
Medals!" and "Hands Off Russian Athletes!" (NTVRU, 22 Feb 01; via 
www.ntvru.com) 
 
The spirit in the nation was not even lifted by the day off work Russians received 
to commermorate the Day of the Defenders of the Fatherland. Originally declared 
in 1918 as the Day of the Red Army, the holiday was temporarily in limbo as a 
Soviet vestige. This year, 23 February was a new and improved official national 
holiday of the Russian Federation. Members of the leftist opposition held a 
demonstration, gathering at the Mayakovsky metro station and marching to 
Marshal Zhukov's statue, to call attention to the "disintegration" of the Russian 
armed forces. As communist leader Gennady Zyuganov spoke at the thousands-
strong rally by Zhukov's monument, participants chanted "shame" at the 
government's inability to perform army reform and maintain professionalism. 
There were even calls for the dissolution of the Russian government. Chairman 
of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia Vladimir Zhirinovsky tried to get in on 
the popular sentiments, but was almost beaten up by the enraged communists 
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and had to be whisked off by his bodyguards and driven out of range. (NTVRU, 
23 Feb 01; via www.ntvru.com) 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
The responsible thing to do 
As the parties on either side of the political spectrum make themselves heard 
and seen, and as new parties -- The Constitutional Party of the Russian 
Federation, chaired by Vyacheslav Volkov; Rebirth [Vozrozhdeniye], chaired by 
Yevgeny Ishchenko; and the Party of Working People's Self-Government, 
chaired by Svyatoslav Fedorov -- reorganize and reregister, the Kremlin-faithful 
Unity faction has set as its goal living up to the high standards set by "our 
responsible president." President Putin met with Unity's leaders on 20 February 
in preparation for the annual presidential message to the Federal Assembly and 
praised the party for its "political maturity." Aspects of this "maturity" include 
striving to reform the State Duma, to reduce the number of "bloated 
commissions," to "modernize" rules of procedure, to impose tighter control over 
"target-oriented" spending of funds and on transparency of the lower house 
budget, and to thwart any attempts to "destabilize" the Duma. Unity and United 
Russia, the greater party to which it belongs, seek to gain more control during 
such rearrangements. They also are hoping that, when the law "On State 
Services" goes into effect in 2003 allowing top state officials (including the 
president) to join political parties, President Putin might consider running in the 
2004 campaign from their platform. (ITAR-TASS, 1531 GMT, 19 Feb 02; FBIS-
SOV-2002-0219, and ITAR-TASS, 1415 GMT, 20 Feb 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0220, 
via World News Connection) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Scott Bethel 
 
The art of courting the axis 
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The Russian foreign policy team has made some excellent choices over the last 
year, including active involvement with the United States in the war on terrorism, 
closer relations between the Russian and US presidents, as well as 
rapprochement with NATO. Each of these initiatives represents an increasingly 
warm relationship with the West and, in particular, the United States. However, 
since the beginning of 2002 there has been a shift away from these initiatives. 
First, the Russians have continued to seek opportunities for arms sales to 
nations not in the US orbit. Moscow has concluded important deals with Iran, Iraq 
and India, while aggressively soliciting business in South America and elsewhere 
in the Middle East. Diplomatically Russia also has moved away from a strong 
pro-West agenda. Moscow has developed increasingly warm relations with 
Beijing and overtly backed the Indian side in the long-standing dispute between 
New Delhi and Islamabad. 
 
However, what is more significant on the diplomatic and military front is that 
Moscow has, since President Bush's State of the Union Address on 29 January, 
moved to an even tighter embrace of the so-called "Axis of Evil" -- Iran, Iraq and 
North Korea. The motivation behind this increased closeness is twofold. First, the 
Russians have long-standing cooperative security arrangements with these 
countries. Second, the Russians have invested much time and energy in 
establishing military sales agreements and information exchanges. Still, tracking 
the Russian support for these countries is important to the US as it sizes up 
proposed responses and actions to break the "Axis of Evil." 
 
Making nice with Iraq 
Russia's policy concerning Iraq includes providing support in two key areas. First, 
the Russians have long pursued the lifting of United Nations sanctions against 
the Iraqis. Second, Moscow has strongly backed the Iraqi claim that Baghdad 
has no involvement in international terrorism. (See THE NIS OBSERVED, 13 
Feb 02) 
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Moscow now has instituted a more aggressive regional effort to elicit support for 
its initiatives concerning Iraq. During the week of 17 February, President Putin 
dispatched Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Saltanov to meet with Gulf leaders 
from Iraq, Oman, United Arab Emirates and Kuwait. During this trip, Saltanov's 
message was clear and threefold. 
 
First, Moscow opposes any unilateral military action taken against Iraq by the 
United States. A joint statement issued by the Iraq and Russia clearly stated the 
two countries' position: "It is unacceptable that Iraq is again subjected to the 
threat of aggression." (ITAR-TASS, 1458 GMT, 15 Feb 02; BBC Monitoring, via 
ISI Emerging Markets Database) Though this is among the more forceful 
statements made by the foreign ministry, it is not out of character in terms of the 
theme Russia wants the US to understand: Unilateral action against the Iraqis 
will be met by certain recriminations from Moscow. 
 
Second, the Russians oppose the connection between the Iraqis and the so-
called global terrorism. "(The US) is incorrect in its attempts to link Iraq with some 
'Axis of Evil'." (ITAR-TASS, 1458 GMT, 15 Feb 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and President Putin 
have spent a lot of time and energy over the last three months portraying the 
Iraqis as poor victims of the UN sanctions. In addition Iraq owes Russia some 
$200 million in back payments for weapons and military hardware. 
(BUSINESSWEEK, 3 Sep 01; via www.businessweek.com) Moscow intends to 
collect that debt at some point and hopes to expand trade with Baghdad to a 
level of about $2.3 billion. 
 
Third, Russia seeks to be an integral part of the overall peace process in the 
Middle East. This extends to the situation in Iraq as well as the troubles in Israel. 
In fact, Russia wants to assume a leadership role in that process. The only way 
for the Russians to increase visibility is to do so at the expense of the US. The 
current US administration is leaning away from the Palestinians and closer to the 
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Israelis. This gives the Russians a real opening with the rest of the Arab world 
which, of course, supports the Palestinian position. 
 
The Russians hope to increase their visibility as a "protector of the small guy" 
through support for Iraq and, to some extent, Arafat's Palestine. Saltanov 
summed up the Russian approach to the Gulf during a departing press 
conference: "We hope to reach a comprehensive settlement to the problems in 
Iraq and Palestine. The solution should foresee, on the one hand, restoration of 
cooperation between Iraq and the international community and suspension of 
sanctions and the greater peace in the Middle East." (ITAR-TASS, 1620 GMT, 11 
Feb 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Databases)  
 
Forging closer ties with Iran 
Russia also is working hard to establish friendly relations with Tehran. Besides 
concluding last summer the biggest arms deal since Iran's revolution, Russia has 
moved quickly to bolster closer diplomatic and military ties with the Islamic state. 
The Russians again are courting a country "outside" the international mainstream 
and attempting to develop some dependence on Moscow for security and even 
protection. 
 
To accomplish this, Moscow has reached out to the new, "more moderate" 
government in Tehran. In addition to the major arms deals, there is increased 
effort in both capitals to establish longer-lasting relations. Recent talks between 
diplomats in Tehran yielded some important clues as to the future of relations 
between the two countries. 
 
"The development of Russian-Iranian cooperation will create conditions for the 
building of a security belt in the region," Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov said. 
(ITAR-TASS, 1811 GMT, 19 Feb 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) Clearly, the Russians view Iran as a strategic partner rather than just 
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a weapons sales client. This is a significant shift in regional alliances; Russia is 
the first nation to court Iran openly. 
 
Of further interest is Russia's ability to protect both a client and strategic partner 
from alleged indignities suffered at the hands of the United States. Russia's 
ambassador to Iran said, "to date, the American side has failed to present any 
hard evidence of Tehran's alleged involvement in supporting terrorism." (RIA, 
1740 GMT, 13 Feb 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) In 
the face of American foreign policy aimed at containing what it considers to be 
the rogue states in the "Axis of Evil," Russia is demonstrating its determination to 
deal with any country it pleases until linkages to international terrorism can be 
proven. This applies especially to Iran and Iraq. 
 
Russia and Iran already enjoy a close military sales relationship. They recently 
began to take steps for the Russians to sell modernized air defense systems to 
the Iranians. A spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry confirmed, "Iran hopes 
for ongoing military-technical cooperation with Russia. Our country plans to 
modernize Iranian Air Defense and it will ask Russia to sell some air defense 
systems in support of that." (ITAR-TASS, 1811 GMT, 19 Feb 01; BBC 
Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) So far, it appears that Iran is 
one of Russia's best customers, paying cash for most of its purchases and willing 
to engage in further trade. 
 
Another reason behind Russian support of the Iranians is the need to dispel the 
charges that Moscow has provided Tehran with nuclear, biological and chemical 
technology. Russian Ambassador Aleksandr Maryasov said, "in accusing Iran of 
attempting to gain access to weapons of mass destruction, primarily nuclear 
weapons, the Americans obliquely and sometimes directly hint at cooperation 
between Moscow and Tehran." (RIA, 1740 GMT, 24 Feb 02; BBC Monitoring, via 
ISI Emerging Markets Databases) Though engaged in ongoing arms trade with 
all three of the countries identified by President Bush, Russia wants to ensure 
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that it is not considered to be in any way an exporter of weapons of mass 
destruction. 
 
However, Russia will continue to support Iran politically and diplomatically in 
order to ensure a good customer is on board for the long haul. In addition, Russia 
wants to send a clear message to other states pushed out of the mainstream by 
the US-dominated international community that there is an alternative. Russia 
long has desired to return to international prominence; allying itself with outsiders 
such as Iran is one route to that end. 
 
Befriending the North Koreans 
The final element in the "Axis of Evil" also has renewed effective relations with 
Moscow. North Korea has made strong efforts since last year to revitalize its 
relationship with Russia. These efforts included a rare trip outside of his country 
by North Korea's leader, Kim Jong-Il, to Moscow and a visit by President Putin to 
Pyongyang. In addition, Russia has come out strongly in opposition to the 
classification of North Korea as a supporter of terrorism. However, unlike the two 
Middle East nations, the Russian response towards North Korea's inclusion in the 
axis has been more cautious. Still, there is no doubt that the Russians support 
Kim and his countrymen against US accusations. "Russia does not now and will 
not agree to the characterization of North Korea as part of an 'axis of evil' and will 
oppose any further isolation of this important member of the international 
community," a spokesman for the Russian foreign ministry said. (ITAR-TASS, 
1311 GMT, 14 Feb 01; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
The relationship between the two countries had languished for some time prior to 
its revitalization spurred by President Putin's visit to Pyongyang last year. 
However, it is important to note that, as in the case with Iran, Russia is one of the 
few nations to carry on effective diplomatic relations with Pyongyang. Ongoing 
support of North Korea and its leadership sends a strong message to other 
nations similarly out in the cold that Russia will stand by its friends. 
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Bad sports 
It appears that Russians never miss an opportunity to complain at the highest 
levels. After a much-publicized episode of improper scoring with the pairs ice-
skating competition in which the Russian team had to share gold with the 
Canadians, it appears that Moscow wanted a full Olympic recount. 
 
Russian Olympic officials lodged a formal protest over everything from the 
refereeing in ice hockey to the disqualification of a cross-country skier for drug 
use. (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 22 Feb 02; via nytimes.com) In addition, not 
surprisingly, the Russians demanded a recount in the women's figure skating 
competition. An American skater finished first and the Russian a distant second. 
 
Most interesting about these complaints was that they involved not only the 
Russian Olympic Federation (ROF), but also the Duma and President Putin. 
"Russian sportsmen are being subjected to biased and prejudiced officiating at 
the Olympic Games," Putin said. (ITAR-TASS, 1003 GMT, 22 Feb 01; BBC 
Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Even Foreign Minister Igor 
Ivanov weighed in: "Russian sportsmen may have to reconsider future 
participation in the Olympic Games due to poor officiating." (ITAR-TASS, 1214 
GMT, 22 Feb 01; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Whenever the Russians lodged a protest, the governing body of the specific 
sport evaluated the officiating and provided feedback to the ROF. Sports 
governing bodies stood with the original officials' decisions, however. In the case 
of the disqualified cross-country skier, the blood tests were re-evaluated and 
confirmed, and the disqualification stood. (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 24 Feb 01 
via nytimes.com) 
 
The comedy surrounding the officiating (the Russians threatened to pull out of 
the closing ceremonies and perhaps even the games) is a throwback to the old 
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Cold War tit-for-tat days. The Russians clearly were embarrassed by the 
implication that there may have been some effort to influence the judging of the 
figure skating competition and wanted compensation in other events. Notably 
Putin himself got into the debate, much as Khrushchev or Brezhnev might have 
done 30 years ago. One can only hope this Cold War on ice doesn't translate into 
a real Cold War. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces and Military-
Industrial Complex 
By Walter Jackson 
 
How long to make sergeant? 
The backbone of any successful military is its non-commissioned officers 
(NCOs). Without this cadre of seasoned and experienced leadership, there is no 
respect among subordinates, nor trust among superiors. That is one of many 
challenges that face Russia's army today. In the Russian army, surprisingly, it 
only takes five months (including basic military training) for an 18-year-old 
enlistee to make sergeant. Respected Russian military author Pavel Felgengauer 
writes, "The Russian army is degenerating. It is over a million men strong -- 
larger than any other army in the world -- but even elementary discipline in units 
cannot be maintained, to say nothing of any fighting ability. The corps of 
seasoned professional NCOs maintaining discipline and order in units is the 
nucleus of any reliable army. Russian generals are lying when they say that the 
army is so bad because servicemen are such a [poor] quality." (MOSKOVSKIE 
NOVOSTI, 22 Feb 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and Security 
Database) The army is, after all, a reflection of society, so what are the generals 
saying about the youth of Russian society? 
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It is not their fault that, by necessity, they are put in charge of other 18 year olds, 
forming an undisciplined, ineffective and disorganized army. Sergeants 
traditionally serve as the older brother, or even father figures. Without that 
maturity and discipline, there is little hope for the armed forces. Why can't Russia 
attract and keep NCOs in the military? What about the best-paid Russian troops, 
the "peacekeepers"? 
 
Promises, promises 
The defense ministry apparently has cheated peacekeeping forces out of $500 
million. Back in 1996, in order to recruit or "entice" Russians into the forces, the 
finance ministry issued decree No 110 mandating the daily pay of $20 to each 
"peacekeeper" in Abkhazia. However, the defense ministry ignored this decree 
and only paid these forces 22 rubles per day, knowingly violating the law. 
"Peacekeeping" forces in Transdniestr, Tajikistan and South Ossetia were 
treated similarly. (VERSIYA, 22 Feb 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense 
and Security Database) 
 
At a crucial time when Russia is debating the creation of a professional army, 
and how much troops would be paid, it is doubtful that any potential recruits 
would believe official promises. Thousands of ex-"peacekeepers" are speaking 
out, demanding their back pay. The military understands the disastrous financial 
consequences this will have on both recruitment and retention. But as a result of 
the new revised runaway inflationary figures for 2002, there isn't enough money 
to fund this year's budget, let alone repay soldiers. Thus the lure of high pay for 
conscripts is a sham. 
 
Is two-thirds really better than none? 
The Russian Duma, after thinking it had approved a manageable defense budget 
for 2002, just discovered that the 2001 budget actually was funded only at 67%, 
despite a reported surplus. Deputy Duma Speaker Georgy Boos revealed these 
new statistics and said that the military-industrial complex also was affected by 
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the shortfall. Not only have military personnel been underpaid, but defense 
industry personnel payrolls are between two to six months behind. 
(KOMMERSANT, 20 Feb 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and Security 
Database) 
 
Reality check 
Until Russia's leaders come to grips with reality, they will never be able to field a 
modern, effective military. They know they have to cut their military force 
structure, but refuse to do so. Dreams of having the world's biggest military 
cannot exist with current funding. They know it, the Russian populace knows it, 
and the world knows it. Economic recovery and prosperity will elude Russia until 
its military force infrastructure is cut dramatically and attention is devoted to the 
economy. Bigger isn't always better, and Russia's military capabilities will 
continue to erode, largely due to its bloated size. Unfortunately in the short term 
they will likely just print more rubles. 
 
MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 
Economic fact or fiction 
While the optimistic projections for Russia's 2002 budget were being aired, some 
prominent Russian skeptics were not easily fooled. According to an interview at 
the end of January with YABLOKO faction leader Grigori Yavlinsky, Russia's 
economic success during 2001 was based on favorable prices for oil exports and 
a "cheap" ruble as a result of the 1998 devaluation. Yavlinsky observed that, 
while Russian exporters became richer, the country as a whole became poorer. 
(VREMYA NOVOSTEI, 30 Jan 02; via RFE/RL Newsline) Mikhail Delyagin, 
director of the Institute of Globalization, said during an economic symposium in 
Moscow on 29 January, the "time of spontaneous economic growth [in Russia] 
has expired," although Russian Prime Minister Kasyanov's government has 
refused to grasp that reality. (KOMMERSANT-DAILY, 29 Jan 02; via RFE/RL 
Newsline) Meanwhile Kasyanov was directed by President Vladimir Putin to 
submit a new macroeconomic plan by 15 February, designed to ensure 
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economic stability through 2004. (ITAR-TASS, 29 Jan 02; via RFE/RL Business 
Watch) Coming so quickly on the heels of the projected economic prosperity for 
2002, this plan seems to indicate that such projections were overly optimistic. 
 
Economic indicators weak 
The preliminary figures are in for January, and they do not look good. Is the 
Russian economy just off to a slow start or is it about to undergo another crisis 
like the one in August 1998 (when the monthly rate of inflation reached 3.7%)? 
According to recently released figures by the State Statistics Committee, inflation 
for January 2002 averaged 3.1%, greatly exceeding all estimates. If this pace 
continues, inflation could reach 44% in 2002, well beyond the 12% calculated in 
this year's budget. (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 7 Feb 02; What the Papers say, 
via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Yet in a recent interview, Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin issued reassurances 
that things are not really that bad. "I do not think that there are any reasons to 
revise the macroeconomic parameters built into the budget -- I think they will be 
executed. The main ones are as follows: 4.3% of growth in the GDP or 3.8% if 
the average yearly price for oil is $18.5 per barrel; inflation -- 12-14%; the 
average settlement rate of currency -- 31.5 rubles per dollar." Based on the 
January inflationary figures, Kudrin was asked about the likelihood that inflation 
could reach as high as 30%. He stated that "these calculations are 
unprofessional. Annual inflation is assessed based on average parameters for a 
few months, not days. Inflation in January proved about the same as a year ago, 
according to provisional data." (TRUD, 11 Feb 02; What the Papers say, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) 
 
What of the possibility that Russia could end up in the same economic crisis 
currently facing Argentina? After all, Russia must expend $19 billion in 2003 to 
service foreign debt. Kudrin stated that " The Argentine scenario does not 
threaten us at all. Thank God, we have no such debts. Russia's debt now is 
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notably less than 60% of the GDP and this is a significant figure for a state's 
economic stability. There is actually the factor itself of increase in payment for 
foreign debt, but one has to get ready for the payment and we do this." 
 
OK, so inflation is in question, but what about revenues? According to the deputy 
finance minister and chief of the Main Department for the Federal Treasury, 
Tatyana Nesterenko, federal budget revenues for January totaled 159.8 billion 
rubles, while budget spending was 79.8 billion rubles. That appears to be a huge 
surplus; however, beginning in 2002, money going into the pension fund is being 
counted as part of budget revenues. (PARLAMENTSKAYA GAZETA, 13 Feb 02; 
What the Papers Say, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) According to Mikhail 
Delyagin, January's inflation news clearly refutes the government's estimates for 
stable economic growth in 2002. The State Statistics Committee (Goskomstat) 
came under heavy fire after the January figures were published. As a result 
February's estimates (through 11 February), not surprisingly, are projected to be 
better, around 2%. (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 15 Feb 02; What The Papers 
Say, via ISI Emerging Markets Database)  
 
The real state of the Russian economy is anyone's guess, but the challenges are 
clear. Can Russia really keep inflation down to 14% this year, and can (or will) 
Russia actually cut oil exports and keep the average oil price above $18.5 per 
barrel? 
 
The fine art of eradicating debt 
Moscow has developed one method to keep the economy propped up (although 
for how long is unknown). Part of the equation is to give the appearance that the 
economy is stable by demonstrating the country's ability to pay off foreign debt. 
Well, perhaps a better way to put it is that the Russians have perfected creative 
accounting. Almost like a Chapter 11 meeting with creditors, they have met with 
many (creditor) countries and bartered away a significant portion of foreign debt 
with increased weapons sales and joint civilian and military industrial ventures. 
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Then there is the outright "forgiveness of debt" that Russia has been pushing 
hard with the US. Russia has convinced itself (but not the US yet) that this is the 
price that the US must or at least should be willing to accept for the cooperation 
Moscow has provided with the war on terrorism. For the most part, "what's in it 
for me" is apparently Russia's motivation to join the war-on-terrorism coalition. 
 
Bartering 
The Russian debt to Austria totals $2.8 billion. Moscow hopes to double the $1.9 
billion in arms sales to Austria by selling MiG-29 fighters to the Austrian air force, 
and to service the debt by entering into a joint venture to produce Russian MiG-
110 business-class jets in Austria. (VREMYA NOVOSTEI, 29 Jan 02; via RFE/RL 
Newsline) Russia's debt to Spain, amounting to $980 million, likely is to be 
serviced by converting a portion into private investment, and accepting 
repayment of the rest in goods (such as ships and fishing trawlers). (IZVESTIA, 
15 Nov 01; What the Papers Say, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Bulgaria, 
owed $100 million, will be repaid in nuclear fuel, weapons and hard currency; 
also linked are agreements on the issue of Soviet-owned property in Bulgaria, 
the possibilities of Russian ventures into Bulgarian banking (i.e., acquisition of 
Bulgaria's commercial bank Biokhim), and telecommunications (taking part in the 
bid for the Bulgarian Telecommunications Company). There is also the prompt 
payment (supply) of 312 million cubic meters of natural gas owed to Bulgaria 
under the Yamburg Agreement. (BTA (Internet Version-WWW), 1331 GMT, 23 
Jan 02; FBIS-EEU-2002-0123, via World News Connection) Partial payment of 
the $210 million debt to the Czech Republic will be paid in "products," including 
supplying fuel for Czech nuclear power stations, as well as equipment for nuclear 
power engineering research and for energy carriers. (ITAR-TASS, 7 Feb 02; via 
RFE/RL Newsline) 
 
By restructuring debt with creditors, and by expanding its industrial markets 
abroad, Moscow has managed to generate growth in its struggling economy. But 
as Russia attempts to enter and compete within the WTO, more must be done. 
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What good is a budget that cannot handle payrolls for months? Russia's budget 
must include the timely payment of salaries and pensions, as well as utility bills 
for the military. Simply saying that your economy is strong doesn't make it so, 
and certainly won't convince the creditors of the Paris Club, or others outside 
Russia. 
 
Rosoboronexport in the oil business 
On 11 February Russia's leading national weapons exporters, Rosoboronexport 
and Tatneft, signed an agreement that will make it easier to swap Russian 
weapons for foreign oil. LUKoil and Zarubezhneft signed similar agreements with 
Rosoboronexport in 2001. These agreements are more of a business accounting 
arrangement between industries. Countries that want to import Russian arms, but 
lack cash to pay for them, will be able to trade oil reserves instead. On the list of 
potential customers are Iran, Iraq, Mongolia, Jordan and Libya. Only Iran is likely 
to exploit this arrangement fully in the short term. Iraqi sanctions (for now) limit 
this option. (VREMYA NOVOSTEI, 15 Feb 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI 
Defense and Security Database) 
 
Selling everything, or at least trying 
According to Tatyana Shaumyan, the director of the Center of Indian Research at 
the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russia receives $4 billion annually from arms 
exports to India, and hopes to expand that by selling as much weaponry as it 
can. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov visited India on 5 February to 
discuss the sales of TU-22 bombers, the "Admiral Groshkov" aircraft carrier, two 
nuclear submarines, and joint venture aircraft productions. (BBC, 6 Feb 02; via 
RFE/RL Newsline) The joint venture consists of the Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd 
(HAL) manufacture (under license with Russia) of 140 Sukhoi 30-Mk I fighter jets 
(12 per year), with deliveries beginning in 2004 to the Indian Air Force. HAL also 
is upgrading Indian MiG-27Ms with modern navigation, attack and electronic 
countermeasures systems for all weather operations and extended range. HAL 
already has started production of the MiG-27 M, and also will build a modern 
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replacement intermediate jet trainer, the HJT-36, to complement the MiG-27M 
upgraded aircraft. 
 
Other joint Russian-Indian ventures include production of MiG-27M airframes and 
multi-role transport aircraft. (THE ASIAN AGE, 29 Jan 02; FBIS-NES-2002-0129, 
via World News Connection) Russia also signed an agreement last November to 
provide two more 1,000 megawatt nuclear power plants in Kudankulam and 
Tamil Nadu. Both sides pledged to continue cooperating in the peaceful uses of 
atomic energy (including ventures for outer space). (THE PIONEER, 7 Nov 01; 
FBIS-NES-2001-1107, via World News Connection) However, the published 
results of the meetings in New Delhi were very disappointing to Russia. Klebanov 
only managed to close an agreement on the joint design and manufacture of a 
multipurpose transport plane. Apparently, US defense industry competitors have 
been courting Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes, and India reportedly is 
reconsidering its tentative agreements with Russia. (KOMMERSANT, 13 Feb 02; 
What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and Security Database) 
 
Selling anything to anybody 
Myanmar Deputy Foreign Minister Khin Maung Win in September 2000 
reportedly informed the director-general of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency that plans were underway to build a nuclear reactor with Russia's help. 
The $5 billion project will be paid for with raw materials and food products. Win 
also stated that the nuclear technology only would be "used exclusively for 
peaceful purposes," and that "this facility will also make it possible to expand 
nuclear research and will facilitate the training of scientific personnel." (ITAR-
TASS, 1300 GMT, 22 Jan 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0122, via World News 
Connection) 
 
Russian Air Force experts have overseen the completion of the expansion of two 
runways at Mynamar's Meiktila Air Base in preparation for the arrival of 10 MiG-
29 fighter aircraft which that country purchased. (DEMOCRATIC VOICE OF 
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BURMA, 1430 GMT, 27 Jan 02; FBIS-EAS-2002-0128, via World News 
Connection) The aircraft are not seen as posing a direct threat to regional 
stability, according to Thai military officials. However, Russia's military presence 
in Mynamar under the auspices of military training is viewed as unsettling. (THE 
NATION (Internet version), 5 Feb 02; via FBIS-EAS-2002-0205, via World News 
Connection) Given the Mynamar junta's antidemocratic and oppressive politics, 
Russian influence and presence will serve only to legitimize the existing 
government. Is this a government that Russia should push into the nuclear club? 
What accountability would Russia assume down the road if Mynamar were to use 
nuclear technology to threaten the region? If history is any indicator, the phrase 
"not my problem" comes instantly to mind. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
On the front lines 
As the parliamentary elections approach, the battle between the most powerful 
campaign blocs has reached the streets, factories and trains - in most regions. In 
others, it would seem that only certain blocs are allowed. On 20 February, Viktor 
Yushchenko harshly criticized government officials for placing "obstacles" in the 
way of his bloc, Our Ukraine, during the campaign. Among Yushchenko's 
grievances listed in a statement are (1) denials of access to the media, (2) 
destruction of campaign materials, (3) harassment of campaign workers by law 
enforcement officials, and (4) use of disinformation techniques. The statement 
notes, in particular, a meeting that Yushchenko claims was held in Simpferopol 
between various law enforcement officials. "During the meeting," he said, "orders 
were issued to suppress Our Ukraine in any form." (UKRAINIAN NEWS, 21 Feb 
02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
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Yushchenko's suggestions might seem like electioneering, were it not for 
Ukraine's spotty electoral history and a report recently issued by a non-partisan 
Western-backed NGO. In early February, the Committee of Voters of Ukraine 
(CVU), which is supported by the National Democratic Institute for International 
Affairs, issued its findings on the campaign so far. The results did little to 
reassure those concerned about unfair election practices in the country. 
 
According to the CVU report, "In January, 50 long-term observers visited 577 
cities and 679 political party branches, and attended 418 events conducted by 
political groups," noting violations of "fundamental political freedoms" and 
Ukrainian election law. The conclusions paralleled Yushchenko's charges in 
many ways. The organization noted that state officials campaigned or used state 
resources "to support favored political candidates or groups," while also applying 
"pressure on some political parties, candidates and media outlets." 
 
Most of the violations listed in the report clearly favored the pro-presidential For a 
United Ukraine bloc. For example, in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast', "educational 
institutions received a formal 'recommendation' of the oblast' administration for 
students and teachers to prepare placards with such messages as . . . 'For 
United Ukraine.'" And in Zakarpatie Oblast', deputies of the rayon administration 
were encouraged to work for the For a United Ukraine bloc, and they in turn 
encouraged their subordinates to do the same. (CVU LONG-TERM 
OBSERVATION REPORT ON THE 2002 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, Jan 
02; via www.ndi.org) 
 
Even with this state support, however, the latest polls suggest that For a United 
Ukraine is doing anything but garnering public support. In fact, in one poll, its 
numbers have decreased. In contrast, Our Ukraine is at the very least 
maintaining -- and according to some reports increasing - its slight lead over the 
Communist Party in the polls. The Center for Economic and Political Research 
finds Our Ukraine with 18.8 percent of the support of respondents, followed 
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closely by the Communist Party with 15.2 percent. The firm suggests that "the 
four-percent barrier could be cleared by the For a United Ukraine bloc." 
(INTELLINEWS, 18 Feb 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Meanwhile, the 
Institute of Social Research and Social Monitoring finds 19.7 percent support for 
Our Ukraine (versus 16.7 percent in January), and 13.3 percent support for the 
Communist Party (15.5 percent in January). For a United Ukraine would be 
supported by 4.4 percent (6.2 percent in January). (UKRAINIAN NEWS, 19 Feb 
01; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
These latest polls have attracted the ire of For a United Ukraine, however, with 
the bloc's leader, Volodymyr Lytvyn, accusing the firms that conducted the 
surveys of working for his opponents. (UKRAINIAN NEWS, 15 Feb 02; via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) This allegation has been met with amusement by 
Ukraine's most important polling companies. The head of the Socis Centre called 
it "strange, to say the least." (UNIAN, 21 Feb 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) Perhaps. But, perhaps not. Lytvyn's suggestion 
that his bloc will receive "at least 25 percent of the vote" actually may be more 
alarming than amusing. Just how is Lytvyn planning to arrange this feat? 
 
With this question in mind, it appears the polling firms have struck back. On 21 
February, the four largest companies announced that they will work together to 
conduct exit polls during the election. In one of the saddest possible indictments 
of Ukrainian society, Institute of Politics Director Mykola Tomenko explained, 
"The authorities will then fall under an optical gaze, and it will be more difficult for 
them to falsify the election." (UKRAINIAN NEWS, 21 Feb 02; via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) 
 
While it is indeed reassuring to know that they, along with observers from 
around the world, will be there, it is more than disconcerting that they are 
necessary after a decade of independence. 
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MOLDOVA 
On the edge of something 
The Communist-led Moldovan government must be wondering how so many 
things could go so wrong for it so quickly. At the start of 2002, President Vladimir 
Voronin was flush with confidence; he seemed to have no doubt that his 
government could carry out whatever policies it chose. With no public debate, he 
announced plans to reintroduce compulsory Russian-language training. He 
successfully proposed that parliament (with a large Communist majority) 
immediately replace Moldovan "districts" with Soviet-style, centrally controlled 
rayons. He and the parliament unilaterally announced early local elections, 
purportedly to carry out redistricting, but more likely to weed out uncooperative 
mayors. And, he began a campaign against reformist Gagauzia Governor 
Dumitru Croitor, accusing him of embezzlement, among other financial 
improprieties. The charges were quickly dismissed by the OSCE Mission to 
Moldova, which, unusually, issued a statement in support of Croitor's 
administration. Nevertheless, Voronin's campaign against Croitor resulted in an 
announcement by the Gagauzia parliament that a public referendum would be 
held to oust the governor. But that was then. 
 
Now, Voronin's government has been forced by protest actions to abandon, or at 
least put off, its Russian-language plans. It has been forbidden by the 
constitutional court to hold the early local elections, and the proposed 
referendum to oust Governor Croitor has been found to be illegal. So, with little to 
show for his effort, Voronin is plagued now with an ethnic Romanian-nationalist 
opposition galvanized over the language issue, a number of mayors that have 
been poked awake with a very small stick, and a previously stable autonomous 
territory descending into virtual chaos. Not a bad month's work, really. 
 
How did it get this way? When small protests began following the sudden 
announcement that Russian would be taught in all schools, it seemed that the 
government would be able to ride out the repercussions. But then, even as ethnic 
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Romanian activists demonstrated against the language decision, Voronin 
inexplicably chose to announce that the "History of the Romanian People" would 
be removed from the country's education curriculum. It would be replaced, his 
government suggested, with "Moldovan History" based on the interpretations of 
Communist-approved historians. 
 
The curriculum change motivated a number of student groups to become 
involved in the protest action, which was organized superbly by Christian 
Democratic People's Party (CDPP) leader Iurie Rosca. Soon, between 20,000 
and 30,000 persons were amassing daily in central Chisinau. On 21 February, 
the demonstrators managed to break through police lines protecting the 
parliament building. Although they were stopped by Rosca before entering the 
building, the action must have impressed officials inside. Shortly after, 
government leaders rescinded the decision to make Russian-language 
instruction compulsory (for now) and promised to keep Romanian history in the 
curriculum. (BESAPRESS, 1056 GMT, 22 Feb 02; BBC Monitoring, via lexis-
nexis) 
 
These announcements did little to tone down Rosca's rhetoric, however. He 
called on the public to participate in a demonstration marking the first anniversary 
of "Bolshevik rule" in Moldova. On 24 February, tens of thousands responded, 
calling for the government to resign. Although the number of participants in the 
rally is difficult to estimate (news sources list anywhere from 20,000 to 80,000), 
there is no question that Rosca's protest was a success. He quickly promised to 
hold another action on 31 March. (ITAR-TASS, 1201 EST, 24 Feb 02; via lexis-
nexis) 
 
It is important to note, however, that even though Rosca's protest achieved his 
main goals -- forestalling the introduction of Russian and keeping Romanian 
history in the curriculum -- his protest failed to rouse the support of the general 
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Moldovan population. Still, the action was an unexpected thorn in Voronin's side 
this past month. 
 
Rosca was not concentrating solely on his demonstrations, however. He was 
also leading the constitutional fight against the government's decision to hold 
early local elections. He was aided in this by Chisinau Mayor Serafim Urechean -
- one of the first mayors to speak out against the plan. (RIA OREANDA, 29 Jan 
02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Although Urechean himself was in little 
danger of losing his position, the mayor long has been an opponent of Voronin 
and consistently vies with him for power in the capital. In doing so, Urechean has 
allied himself with the Council of Europe's (CE) Congress of Regional and Local 
Authorities. In fact, pressure from the CE was largely responsible for Voronin's 
decision to lift a ban on Rosca's CDPP activities -- arbitrarily instituted when the 
language protests first began. This time, however, it was the constitutional court 
that forced the Chisinau central authorities to back down, supporting Rosca's 
appeal. It seems that, for the moment, Rosca and Urechean are an effective 
team. 
 
They are being joined in their opposition to Voronin by Gagauzia Governor 
Dumitru Croitor. The governor also fought back decisively last week against the 
Moldovan central authorities -- using his territory's police in a final demonstration 
of power. For weeks Croitor had been under attack from Voronin, who spoke out 
repeatedly about the governor's removal. During a televised address on 9 
February, for example, Voronin urged voters in Gagauzia to oust Croitor. The 
governor, he suggested, "is too busy with his personal problems and knows the 
road to the breakaway Dneistr region capital Tiraspol better than the road to 
Chisinau, which he has practically forgotten." (BESAPRESS, 11 Feb 02; BBC 
Monitoring, via lexis-nexis) Croitor received support from an unexpected source, 
however. The OSCE Mission to Moldova quickly released a statement 
recognizing "with deep concern a number of activities carried out in recent days 
against the democratically-elected authorities of the Gagauzian Autonomy." Even 
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more, the mission noted, "These incidents involve a group of [Gagauzia] deputies 
as well as the Ministry of Interior and the Security and Information Service of the 
Republic of Moldova." (PRESS RELEASE, OSCE MISSION TO MOLDOVA, 5 
Feb 02) 
 
It turned out that Croitor did not need the support. Although the Gagauzia 
parliamentarians who proposed the referendum garnered 21 votes to approve 
the measure, they needed 23, according to the Gagauzian constitution. The 
referendum was therefore declared unconstitutional by the court. When officials -
- aided by Chisinau -- attempted to hold voting on 24 February anyway, Croitor's 
representatives confiscated all voting materials, while police shut down polling 
places. (ITAR-TASS, 1048 EST, 24 Feb 02; via lexis-nexis) And that, as they 
say, was that. 
 
All of these events, of course, were happening against the backdrop of economic 
collapse in the country. Earlier this month, the government dismissed Economics 
Minister Adrei Cucu, while Finance Minister Ceslav Ciobanu resigned. (For 
background, see the Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 7 Feb 02) The ministers 
were the last remaining members of the 2001 Dumitru Braghis government, and 
their loss was met first with regret by the World Bank, and then by irritation, as 
they have yet to be replaced. Shockingly, the chances of any World Bank money 
in the near future seem slim to none. 
 
There also seems to be very little chance that Moldova -- a country that soon 
may connect NATO with Eastern Europe -- is able or willing to stop its downward 
spiral in the near future. The government's inept attempts to force a totalitarian 
state upon its people border on slapstick - the comedic value fades quickly, 
however, when the human cost is weighed. 
 
Whether the opposition to Voronin from people like Rosca, Urechean and Croitor 
will help keep Moldova in the vicinity of a Western path - or whether it is nothing 
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more than a political power play -- remains to be seen. The only thing certain is 
that Moldova is smoldering in the heart of Europe. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
GEORGIA 
Next stop Pankisi for US war on terror 
Today the US government announced that US special forces will be sent to 
Georgia to train and assist a Georgian unit with counter-terrorist operations in 
Pankisi Gorge. "In fact, there are five military experts in Georgia now," said 
Paapa Gaprindashvili, head of the Georgian defense ministry's international 
department. 
 
US defense officials said in Washington that the administration is considering 
sending 100 to 200 soldiers to Georgia to provide anti-terrorist training. 
Gaprindashvili said that a group of US military experts arrived in Georgia earlier 
this month to choose the military units that would take part in the program. The 
US advisers will be led by Otar Shalikashvili, an assistant to the US defense 
secretary, according to Shorena Esakiya, a spokeswoman for the Georgian 
defense ministry. (AP, 27 Feb 02; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Russian spokesmen have reacted cautiously, saying that they would prefer to 
carry out such operations themselves. Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said Moscow 
has repeatedly proposed to Tbilisi that the terrorist threat be dealt with through 
joint efforts." As far as the possible appearance of US troops in Georgia is 
concerned, from our point of view this could still further complicate the already 
complex situation in the region. This position of ours is well known to 
Washington." (RUSSIAN PUBLIC TV (ORT), 1200 GMT, 27 Feb 02) 
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Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov welcomed the news. "We approve of the 
United States' decision to go after the fighters and leaders of al-Qaeda in the 
Pankisi gorge, if they are there," a spokesman for Maskhadov told Agence 
France-Presse. "If Russia conducts an operation in the gorge, thousands of 
innocent people will die, while NATO units are known for their humanity towards 
the civilian population," he added. (AFP, 27 Feb 02; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Controversy had erupted when Philip Remler, the head of the US mission to 
Georgia, told a Georgian newspaper that the US "is elaborating a plan" to "create 
a counter-terrorism force" within the Georgian defense ministry to counter the 
"several tens" of Al-Qaeda mujahadeen who have turned up in Georgia's Pankisi 
Gorge. According to Remler, the fugitives from Afghanistan have contacts with 
"al-Khattab, an Arab terrorist. The latter, for his part, is connected with Osama 
bin Laden. The Pankisi Gorge is an extremely dangerous place for Georgia." 
(INTERFAX, 11 Feb 02, and THE GUARDIAN, 15 Feb 02; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Remler's comments raise many questions that still have not been clarified by US 
officials. It is noteworthy that Remler neither confirms nor denies frequent 
Russian allegations about Chechen links to Al-Qaeda and explicitly identifies 
Khattab as an Arab terrorist. However, if the US government has reason to 
believe that Khattab is in contact with Osama bin Laden wouldn't Khattab himself 
be the appropriate target of these operations? Wouldn't it be of paramount 
importance to apprehend the persons with known ties to bin Laden? It also 
seems significant that Remler identifies the Georgian Ministry of Defense and not 
the Ministry of Security, whose officials allegedly have profited from drug 
smuggling rings which operate out of the Pankisi Gorge. (CHRONOLOGY; via 
civil.ge.pankisi.shtml) 
 
Speaking at the 20 February daily press briefing, State Department Spokesman 
Richard Boucher emphasized that the US is working bilaterally with Georgia and 
there were no plans to resolve the Pankisi problem through joint Russian-
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American cooperation. "What we have always told the Russians is that we felt 
that this situation was best dealt with through cooperation with the United States 
and Georgia, so that Georgia would have better control over the area, better 
control over the borders." According to Boucher, there has been no change in US 
policy. The US government has worked with Georgia on issues of border security 
and provided counterterrorism training in the past and will continue to do so in 
the future. (www.state.gov) 
 
On a trip to St. Petersburg, US Ambassador to Russia Alexander Vershbow said 
that the US does not intend to hold military operations in Georgia. Rather, the US 
plans to "provide military equipment" to help the Georgian government "increase 
its control over the Pankisi Gorge" and Georgia's borders. Vershbow added that 
such operations would "reduce the support from outside for the terrorists fighting 
in Chechnya and help in finding a political solution to the problem." Vershbow 
added that the US has been informing Russian authorities about its plans. (RIA, 
22 Feb 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Returning from a trip to the US, Zurab Zhvania, the former speaker of the 
Georgian parliament, explained that US officials are pressuring the Georgian 
government to bring order to the Pankisi Gorge. "Georgia is obliged to find its 
place in the international struggle against terrorism," he told reporters. (RIA 
OREANDA, 22 Feb 02; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Since the start of the Chechen war in the fall of 1999, Russian officials have been 
accusing Georgia of harboring Chechen fighters among the refugees in the gorge 
and have sought to use the pretext of rampant criminality (including kidnappings 
and drug smuggling) to conduct operations on Georgian territory. Georgian 
officials had denied the presence of Chechen fighters until October 2001 when 
the Chechen commander Ruslan Gelaev and his fighters took part in skirmishes 
in the Kodori Gorge, bordering the separatist region of Abkhazia. In a December 
interview with Moskovskiye novosti, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze 
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admitted that Gelaev and his followers were in Pankisi and explained that their 
outing to Abkhazia was an attempt to return to the North Caucasus; "I was told 
that Russia had guaranteed them safe passage." (For background, see THE NIS 
OBSERVED, 24 Oct 01 and 12 Dec 01) For his part, Chechnya's president, 
Aslan Maskhadov, charged Gelaev with "desertion" and demoted him to the rank 
of private. (THE NIS OBSERVED, 16 Jan 02) Indeed, any Chechen fighters who 
may be operating in Pankisi Gorge are compromising the estimated 7,000 
Chechen civilians who found refuge there and may be repatriated to the conflict 
zone. 
 
CHECHNYA 
Deportation Day remembered 
This year very few publications chose to notice that 23 February is Deportation 
Day. It marks the 58th anniversary of the day in 1944 when Stalin began ti deport 
the Chechens and other nations of the North Caucasus to Central Asia. Among 
the worst crimes of the Stalin era, the deportations were accompanied by 
massacres and repression. Hundreds of thousands died of suffocation, disease, 
exposure and starvation. Those deemed "untransportable" -- children, the 
elderly, pregnant women -- were killed. As a result, the Chechen nation declined 
by 25 percent. Those who survived the journey lived in penal colonies in 
subhuman conditions until 1956 when they were allowed to return to their native 
lands. But even then they remained branded a "punished people." To this day, 
not one person has stood trial for the crimes related to the deportations of the 
Chechens. 
 
Various protest actions, prayer services and other types of memorials for the 
victims were held throughout Europe, including in London, Prague, Warsaw, 
Paris, Rome and Moscow. The Boston Committee Against Ethnic Cleansing held 
a protest in Copley Square. Participants distributed leaflets and gathered 
signatures for a petition calling on the Russian president to end the system of 
brutal cleansings (zachistakas), begin peace talks and release civilian hostages. 
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Event organizer Victoria Poupko commented that the public seemed very 
sympathetic to the plight of the Chechens: "Most Americans derive from 
immigrants who fled war or hunger or oppression. So it was not surprising that 
Americans responded with compassion. Some persons of Ukrainian or El 
Salvadoran or Haitian background approached us and related their stories." 
Although there was a great deal of goodwill, it also seemed that many 
Bostonians were not well informed about the war in Chechnya. Those who 
refused to sign the petition said they did not know enough to make a judgment. 
"Still, we were gathering signatures at a rate of almost one per minute, " says 
Poupko.. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Michael Donahue 
 
Those who can, do; those who can't, complain 
Geopolitical insecurities abound in Central Asia where Russia's former monopoly 
of influence has been rudely displaced by American combat troops and the 
millions of dollars that follow them around the globe. Russian President Vladimir 
Putin is not, however, the only one concerned with the spreading of American 
hegemony into Central Asia. China, domestic Central Asian opposition groups 
and international human rights organizations also have expressed concern of late 
over the objectives of the American presence, as well as its undetermined 
duration. 
 
In a fit of insecurity, Beijing recently accused the United States of pursuing 
military basing agreements with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in order to facilitate 
spying on China. (EURASIA INSIGHT, 19 Feb 02; via Eurasianet) While it 
certainly is likely that the US is gathering intelligence on China from a variety of 
locations, possibly including Central Asia, it is rather irrational to suggest that the 
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purpose behind recent airbase negotiations is eastern- rather than western-
oriented. In contemplating any "second front" in the war on terror, specifically 
against Iran, the logic behind basing strike and reconnaissance aircraft in Central 
Asia could be seen only as a necessity. However, self-important paranoia seems 
to have taken hold in Beijing. 
 
In an increasingly feeble effort to keep the Chinese foot in the Central Asian 
door, Chinese State Councilor Ismail Amat visited Bishkek in mid-January in 
order to emphasize the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as the most 
practical and effective vehicle for regional stability and security, an obvious 
attempt to draw the region away from Washington. (XINHUA, 2009 GMT, 17 Jan 
02; FBIS-CHI-2002-0117, via World News Connection) The SCO is certainly a 
practical vehicle for Russia and China meddling into the affairs of these states 
that have newfound importance on the international stage, but it is unlikely to be 
stabilizing: The two dominant forces within the organization have opposing 
agendas, and even the combined military capabilities of the SCO fall short of 
those of the United States. Furthermore, and much to the chagrin of Beijing and 
Moscow, Amat could not make the same bold declaration in the area of 
economic and social development. For regional development in these critical 
areas, only the European Union and the United States have the economic depth 
to bring the region's potential to fulfillment. 
 
In Mother Russia, Putin himself has come under harsh criticism from hard-line 
opponents who claim he has, for lack of better terminology, been "soft on 
capitalism." The tacit acceptance of an American military presence in Central 
Asia has been called by some in the Russian media as a "significant threat to 
Russian national security." (EURASIA INSIGHT, 12 Feb 02; via Eurasianet) The 
reasoning behind this paranoia is the fear that the Russian-dominated Collective 
Security Treaty (CST) will fall by the wayside as the critical members 
(Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan) create binding bilateral agreements with 
the United States. 
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The true concern for Putin's critics, however, is not diminished security but 
diminished hegemony, as American and regional prosecution on the war on 
terror likely will result in fewer Islamic-extremist organizations and thereby 
enhance Russia's security. It is probable that both the Russian president and his 
opponents fully understand this basic fact, however, Putin's opposition can 
muster popular support through appealing to the bruised ego of average 
Russians who long for a return to the time when the world trembled at their 
footsteps. What they fail to grasp, however, is that Putin's "soft" policy toward 
Central Asia is not borne of Wilsonian idealism or even Bismarckian realism, but 
of a simple cost-benefit analysis of the situation. The cost of attempting to check 
American regional influence is possibly higher than Moscow can pay, even at the 
low end of the spectrum. Russia is simply incapable of competing economically 
or militarily with the United States, even in its own backyard. A more important 
question is: Why should Moscow even try?  
 
Putin also has a better answer to this question than his critics do. In the long run, 
Moscow stands to gain from the American involvement in Central Asia for a 
number of reasons. First, the most likely outcome of the campaign against terror 
in the region is a decrease in the number Islamic extremist organizations. 
Secondly, and related to the first, this decrease will help stabilize the region and 
firm up Russia's "soft underbelly." Third, the entire region is experiencing an 
influx of aid that can result only in substantive improvements in infrastructure and 
socioeconomic stability. Fourth, the foreign investment climate will be stabilized 
to facilitate exploitation of Caspian energy reserves, from which Russia will 
benefit handsomely. And finally, all of this is going to be done largely on the 
backs of the American and European economies. Metternich he is not, but Putin 
may be smarter than his opponents like to admit. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
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By Michael Varuolo 
 
What exactly does NATO want? 
As the November NATO summit approaches, recent discussions within the 
alliance may be an unpleasant foreshadowing of things to come. As recently as 
18 February, Foreign Ministry Deputy Chancellor Harri Tiido tried to calm both 
the Estonian public and the international community by acknowledging that 
failure to obtain an invitation to the alliance would make the situation in Estonia 
difficult but would not be a disaster. (ETA, 1618 GMT, 18 Feb 02; FBIS-SOV-
2002-0218, via World News Connection) 
 
The timing of such a proclamation is significant because it was made amidst 
several major events key to Baltic aspirations to join NATO. The first was a 14 
February meeting between Baltic diplomats, including Tiido, and Italian 
representatives, during which the Italians stressed the importance of expanding 
NATO in both a northern and southern direction and stated that any future 
expansion must be balanced within this need. (BNS, 1441 GMT, 14 Feb 02; 
FBIS-SOV-2002-2015, via World News Connection) Although Italian diplomats 
acknowledged that Italy fully supported NATO expansion, they did not commit to 
supporting publicly any of the Baltic states for membership to the alliance. This 
now marks Italy, along with fellow alliance members France and Turkey, as 
supporting the inclusion of southern states in the next round of expansion, either 
along with or instead of the Baltic states. 
 
This was followed by the 20 February meeting between President Arnold Ruutel 
of Estonia and Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik of Norway, during which 
Ruutel had the difficult task of assuring Bondevik that Estonia is interested in 
pursuing good relations with Russia. (BNS, 1629 GMT, 20 Feb 02; FBIS-SOV-
2002-0220, via World News Connection) Although the meeting ended with 
Bondevik reaffirming his country's support for the Baltic states' entry into NATO, 
it highlights the fact that concerns about Russia's stance towards the Baltics is 
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still an issue that surfaces in expansion discussions, even among strong 
supporters of the Baltics such as Norway. Throughout the week NATO's critical 
eye remained focused upon the Baltic states, not only in Estonia but Latvia as 
well. 
 
When NATO Secretary-General George Robertson spoke to the Latvian 
parliament, he stressed the adoption of democratic reforms and then proceeded 
to address explicitly the Latvian election law before mentioning the responsibility 
and economic costs of membership in the alliance. (LETA, 1511 GMT, 21 Feb 
02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0221, via World News Connection) The election law, which 
requires top-level state-language proficiency for candidates, was revisited again 
by Robertson when he meet with officials in the foreign ministry. The law has 
long been a controversial topic within Latvia. Even before Robertson's visit, 
Latvian President Vaire Vike-Freiberga spoke of this issue at the 46th 
Conference of Latvian Intellectuals; she noted that NATO is not forcing a change 
in the election laws but acknowledged that if Latvia wanted to be part of the 
alliance it should abide by the alliance's standards. (BNS, 1110 GMT, 15 Feb 02; 
FBIS-SOV-2002-0215, via World News Connection) 
 
The November NATO summit is still a long way off and much is left to be 
decided, but, as Robertson pointed out, democracy develops dynamically. This is 
even more important in regard to NATO, with its consensual structure. As the 
final discussions concerning expansion take place among alliance members, the 
Baltic states will come under more and more scrutiny, especially if NATO feels 
there are unresolved issues. 
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